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I. INTRODUCTION
You are the owner of a small business. A few years ago, you
asked a white female employee to make a delivery to another
part of town. While making her delivery, your employee was
accosted by a large African American man. She was thrown to
the ground and left with a broken vertebrae, in a state of shock.
Your employee regained her physical health. Mentally,
however, she did not fare so well; she has been plagued by emo-
tional troubles ever since. She has nightmares in which she
relives the attack, and being near black males causes her to
experience panic attacks. The attacks bring on sweating, panic,
and a rapid heartbeat. She is undergoing psychiatric treatment
and has been diagnosed as having post-traumatic stress disor-
der and simple phobia. She does not experience similar night-
mares or panic concerning men who are white or members of
other racial groups.
Now the employee asks to speak with you in private. She
demands that you accommodate her condition by segregating
her from all African American males in her work section. What
can you do? What must you do? If you consult an attorney for
help, he or she will look to the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990 (ADA)' for guidance. The ADA, however, will not pro-
vide much assistance.2
The ADA and the Civil Rights Act of 19643 have profoundly
impacted how employers treat persons with physical or mental
* B.A. 1985, University of Notre Dame; J.D. Candidate 1994, University of Puget
Sound School of Law. My thanks to Professor Melinda Branscomb and Susan
McClellan for their thoughtful comments on earlier versions of this Comment.
1. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. III 1991)).
2. Your employee's request to be accommodated raises other interesting legal
issues, such as equal protection rights and associational rights. Those issues, however,
are beyond the scope of this Comment and will not be discussed here.
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
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disabilities.4 The ADA's individualized approach, coupled with
the broad-reaching remedial provisions of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, 5 force employers to accommodate persons with disabili-
ties to an unprecedented degree.
But the degree of required accommodation is unclear.6 So
too are the standards used to determine whether one is a person
with a disability. In essence, the ADA prevents discrimination
against persons with mental impairments, as long as the
impairments substantially limit those persons' "major life activ-
ities."7 A "mental impairment" is broadly defined as any mental
or psychological disorder, except for certain disorders that Con-
gress chose not to include.'
Conditions such as behavioral disorders, a type of mental
disability,9 are often less apparent to employers than are most
obvious forms of mental disability. Yet such hidden behavioral
disorders are a potentially greater source of stigma, employer
indifference, and, ultimately, job termination. The ADA fails to
address behavior disorders in general and phobias in particular.
Does that mean that all behavioral disorders and phobias are
disabilities under the ADA? Which of the available diagnostic
systems will be used to help the courts decide?
Neither Congress nor the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), the agency responsible for promulgating
many of the regulations under the ADA,' 0 has answered these
questions. Courts cannot simply rely on the broad provisions of
preexisting federal statutes. Without extensive guidance on
what is a mental disability under the ADA, employers and
employees will be left to the haphazard, costly, and time-con-
4. Legislative history indicates that use of the term "disabilities" instead of
"handicaps" reflects Congress' desire to honor the preference of those to whom the term
applies. HousE COMM. ON THE JuDiciARY, H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt.
3, 26-27 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 448-50. "Handicap" was used in
previous laws, such as the primary regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 (45 C.F.R. § 84 (1992)) and the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (24 C.F.R.
§ 100 (1993)). Id.
5. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (Supp. III 1991)).
6. For example, one can look to the implementing regulations for the ADA and find
guidance on how to accommodate persons with physical disabilities. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(o) (1993); see also id. pt. 1630 app. at 408-09. However, the same regulations
and interpretive guidance give little assistance to one who seeks to accommodate
persons with mental impairments. Id.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (Supp. III 1991).
8. Id. §§ 12102(2)(A), 12112(a).
9. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1993); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b) (Supp. III 1991).
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12116-12117, 12206(c)(2)(A) (Supp. III 1991).
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suming alternative of resorting to the courts to determine the
precise nature of their responsibilities and rights in the work-
place. It is time that the EEOC provide that guidance.
This Comment proposes that the EEOC take two actions.
First, the EEOC should pass administrative rules that settle
the question of which standards to use in determining whether
an individual is mentally impaired. Second, and more impor-
tantly, the EEOC should issue interpretive guidance that
acknowledges the burdens facing persons with hidden behav-
ioral anomalies and phobias, and gives these persons additional
help under the Act.
Part II of this Comment describes the ADA generally. It
explains the Act's purpose and summarizes the Act's legal
requirements. Part III describes the legal requirements for
bringing a mental impairment case under the ADA. Cases
decided under the Rehabilitation Act of 197311 are used to illus-
trate the legal hurdles that face an ADA plaintiff and to provide
guidance as to how similar cases would be decided under the
ADA. Finally, Part IV of this Comment examines some of the
pragmatic concerns of employers and employees regarding per-
sons with hidden disorders and proposes that the EEOC take
steps to ameliorate the treatment of such persons under the
ADA.
II. THE ADA GENERALLY AND MENTAL IMPAIRMENTS
Former President George Bush signed the ADA into law on
July 26, 1990.2 The Act is a comprehensive plan that seeks to
prohibit discrimination against persons with disabilities. Cer-
tain aspects of the ADA, such as which employers are covered,
what burdens of proof are used, and what damages are avail-
able, are roughly patterned after Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act. The ADA has five titles, the first of which governs the hir-
ing and employment of disabled Americans.13 While the Act
does not guarantee jobs for persons with disabilities, 4 it does
specify that employers may not discriminate against disabled
11. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1988).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (Supp. 111 1991).
13. Id. §§ 12111-12117. The other four titles include Public Services, Public
Accommodation and Services Operated by Private Entities, Telecommunications, and
Miscellaneous Provisions. Id. § 12007.
14. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. at 400 (1993) (indicating that the purpose of Title I
is to ensure that qualified persons with disabilities are protected from discrimination on
the basis of their disability).
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persons who meet the job-related requirements for a particular
position and who can perform the essential functions of the job,
with or without reasonable accommodation. 15 Section A below
examines the purpose of the ADA. Section B addresses the sub-
stantive law of the ADA.
A. Purpose of the ADA
The ADA's main purpose is to ensure that individuals with
disabilities are not excluded from job opportunities unless such
individuals are actually unable to do the job. 6 Secondarily, the
ADA attempts to prevent "common attitudinal barriers" that
often result in employers excluding individuals with disabilities
by requiring that employers ensure that job criteria in fact mea-
sure skills required on the job."7 The ADA presumes that, once
we as a society grow accustomed to measuring job requirements
by the essential skills of the job, we will more readily accept
persons with disabilities into the work force.
The ADA requires that individuals with disabilities be
given the same consideration for employment that individuals
without disabilities are given.' But a major policy question is
how far the ADA ought to go to affect the workplace. Should the
ADA attempt to revolutionize the way employers treat their
employees in general? Does the ADA require employers to give
the same level of accommodation to an employee with a behav-
ioral anomaly as the employer would give to a worker with a
physical disability? The law is unclear. It seems that courts
will have to decide unless the EEOC clarifies the issue. A brief
discussion of the substantive law of the ADA will put the issue
into perspective.
B. The Substantive Law of the ADA
Briefly stated, the ADA prohibits a covered entity 9 from
discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), 12112(a) (Supp. III 1991).
16. See 136 CONG. REC. H2438 (daily ed. May 17, 1990) (statement of Rep. Don
Edwards (D-Cal.)) ("Like other civil rights laws, the ADA does not require employers to
hire unqualified persons, nor does it require employers to give preference to a person
with disabilities. The ADA simply states that a person's disability should not be an
adverse factor in the employment process.").
17. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. at 406 (1993); see 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(a)(7), 12112(b)(6)
(Supp. III 1991).
18. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. at 400 (1993).
19. A "covered entity" is an employer, employment agency, labor organization, or
joint labor-management committee. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) (Supp. III 1991). An
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because of the disability.20 For simplicity, this Comment refers
to all covered entities as "employers."
1. Stating a Case Under the ADA
To successfully state a case under the ADA, one must first
prove discrimination.2 1 To "discriminate" under the ADA is to
directly limit or segregate individuals because of their disabili-
ties, to use standards or criteria that have the effect of discrimi-
nating, or to fail to make reasonable accommodations to the
known physical or mental limitations of applicants or
employees.2 2
"employer" is "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more
employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding year" with certain exceptions. Id. § 12111(5)(A). Exempt are the United
States, a corporation wholly owned by the government of the United States, an Indian
tribe, or a bona fide private membership club that is exempt from taxation under
section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. Id. § 12111(5)(B).
20. Id. § 12112(a).
21. Id.
22. Id. § 12112(b). The Act provides in full that the term "discriminate" includes
the following:
(1) limiting, segregating, or classifying a job applicant or employee in a way
that adversely affects the opportunities or status of such applicant or employee
because of the disability of such applicant or employee;
(2) participating in a contractual or other arrangement or relationship that
has the effect of subjecting a covered entity's qualified applicant or employee
with a disability to the discrimination prohibited by this subchapter (such
relationship includes a relationship with an employment or referral agency,
labor union, an organization providing fringe benefits to an employee of the
covered entity, or an organization providing training and apprenticeship
programs);
(3) utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration-
(A) that have the effect of discrimination on the basis of disability; or
(B) that perpetuate the discrimination of others who are subject to
common administrative control;
(4) excluding or otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified
individual because of the known disability of an individual with whom the
qualified individual is known to have a relationship or association;
(5)(A) not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an
applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the
business of such covered entity; or
(B) denying employment opportunities to a job applicant or employee who is an
otherwise qualified individual with a disability, if such denial is based on the
need of such covered entity to make reasonable accommodation to the physical
or mental impairments of the employee or applicant;
(6) using qualification standards, employment tests or other selection criteria
that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or a class of
individuals with disabilities unless the standard, test or other selection
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A discrimination claim, thus, involves an individual with a
disability. An "individual with a disability" is one who (1) has a
current physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more of the individual's major life activities, (2) has a
record of having such impairment, or (3) is regarded as having
such an impairment. 23 Congress chose to exclude several disor-
ders from the definition of "disability"; these excluded disorders
include gender identity disorders not resulting from physical
impairments, voyeurism, kleptomania, compulsive gambling,
and pyromania.24
An individual with a disability is "qualified" if he or she
meets the skill, experience, education, and other job-related
requirements of a position held or desired, and can perform the
essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable
accommodation.25
criteria, as used by the covered entity, is shown to be job-related for the
position in question and is consistent with business necessity; and
(7) failing to select and administer tests concerning employment in the most
effective manner to ensure that, when such test is administered to a job
applicant or employee who has a disability that impairs sensory, manual, or
speaking skills, such test results accurately reflect the skills, aptitude, or
whatever other factor of such applicant or employee that such test purports to
measure, rather than reflecting the impaired sensory, manual, or speaking
skills of such employee or applicant (except where such skills are the factors
that the test purports to measure).
Id.
23. Id. § 12102(2). The "record of" definition of disability is intended to ensure that
people who have a history of a disability are not discriminated against because of that
history. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. at 405 (1993). The "regarded as" definition of disability
covers those individuals who have impairments that are not substantially limiting, but
their employer perceives the impairment as substantially limiting. Id. The definition
also covers those who have no impairment at all but are regarded by their employers as
being impaired. Id. § 1630.2(l)(3). The rationale for the "regarded as" definition comes
from Congress' belief that "society's accumulated myths and fears about disability and
diseases are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual
impairment." School Board v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b) (Supp. III 1991) provides that the term "disability" shall
not include the following:
(1) transvestitism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism,
gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments, or other
sexual behavior disorders;
(2) compulsive gambling, kleptomania, or pyromania; or
(3) psychoactive substance use disorders resulting from current illegal use of
drugs.
Because they are obviously not impairments, homosexuality and bisexuality are not dis-
abilities within the meaning of Title I of the ADA. Id. § 122 11(a).
25. See id. § 12111(8); EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, A TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE MANUAL ON THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS OF THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT 1-2 (1992) [hereinafter TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL].
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Determining whether the individual has a disability is only
the first step of proving discrimination under the ADA. The
second step requires a showing that the disability substantially
limits the individual in one or more major life activities. 26 A
major life activity is a basic activity that the average person in
the general population can perform with little or no difficulty.
Sitting, standing, lifting, reaching, caring for oneself, walking,
seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working are
major life activities.28 In determining whether a person is sub-
stantially limited in a major life activity, one should consider
the nature and severity of impairment, the duration or expected
duration of the impairment, and the actual or expected long-
term impact of the impairment.29 One should consider whether
a plaintiff is substantially limited in the major life activity of
working only if the plaintiff is not severely impacted in any
other major life activity. 0
26. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (Supp. III 1991). "Substantially limits" means that a
person is
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the
general population can perform; or
(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner, or duration under
which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to
the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the
general population can perform that same major life activity.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) (1993).
27. Id. pt. 1630 app. at 403.
28. Id. § 1630.2(i). This list is not exclusive. Id. pt. 1630 app. at 403.
29. Id. § 1630.2(j)(2).
30. Id. § 1630.2(j)(3). Section 1630.2(j)(3) provides the following:
With respect to the major life activity of working . . . the term
"substantially limits" means significantly restricted in the ability to perform
either a class of jobs or a broad range ofjobs in various classes as compared to
the average person having comparable training, skills, and abilities. The
inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial
limitation in the major life activity of working.
Id.
Three additional factors are to be considered in deciding whether a person's limita-
tion in the major life activity of working is substantial: (1) the geographical area to
which the individual has reasonable access; (2) the job and class of jobs from which the
person was disqualified; and (3) the job from which the person has been disqualified and
the broad range of jobs in various classes from which the person is also disqualified
because of the impairment. id. § 1630.2(jX3)(ii). The EEOC indicates that
an individual is not substantially limited in working just because he or she is
unable to perform a particular job for one employer, or because he or she is
unable to perform a specialized job or profession requiring extraordinary skill,
prowess or talent ....
On the other hand, an individual does not have to be totally unable to work
in order to be considered substantially limited in the major life activity of work-
ing. An individual is substantially limited in working ifthe individual is signif-
388 University of Puget Sound Law Review
In addition to the definitional criteria that a person with
mental impairments must meet, she must demonstrate that she
is qualified for the position, with or without reasonable accom-
modation.3 ' Such proof must be specific to the circumstances
and must include an examination of the job requirements, as
well as any adjustments that could be made to accommodate
the plaintiff.
32
If the plaintiff proves that she is qualified for the position
with or without accommodation, the employer has an affirma-
tive defense that the standards at issue are "job-related and
consistent with business necessity," such that no reasonable
accommodation could accomplish the job. 33 The employer may
also require that individuals not pose a direct threat to the
health or safety of themselves or others in the workplace.34
Furthermore, the employer is not required to provide an accom-
modation if doing so would impose an undue hardship on the
operation of its business.3
5
Substantive requirements aside, the procedural require-
ments of the ADA mirror many of those required for Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act.3 6 The Title VII burden of proof scheme, for
instance, requires the plaintiff to prove that he or she (1) is a
person with a disability under the Act, (2) was otherwise quali-
fied for the position sought, (3) was excluded from the position
because of the disability, and (4) was excluded from a position
that was part of a program or activity of the defendant's covered
entity.3 7 Establishing this prima facie case is the first step in
icantly restricted in the ability to perform a class ofjobs or a broad range ofjobs
in various classes, when compared with the ability of the average person with
comparable qualifications to perform those same jobs.
Id. pt. 1630 app. at 404.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (Supp. III 1991).
32. See id.; see also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. at 406 (1993).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (Supp. III 1991).
34. Id. § 12113(b); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1993).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. III 1991). "Undue hardship" is an
accommodation that is excessively costly, extensive, substantial, or disruptive, or that
would fundamentally alter the nature or operation of the business. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630
app. at 409 (1993).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (Supp. III 1991) (stating that the ADA adopts the
procedures of certain provisions of Title VII); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.,
pt. 27, at 31 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 269 (stating that ADA Title I
borrows much of its procedural framework from Title VII elements).
37. 2 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 50.00
(1993). This is a very basic description of the plaintiffs prima facie case. There are
other burden of proof models, including "pattern and practice" and "mixed motive." Id.
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the plaintiffs lawsuit. The second step differs according to the
burden of proof model chosen."
In sum, the ADA prohibits an employer from discriminat-
ing against a qualified person with a disability because of the
person's disability. Under Title I of the ADA, a phobia or anxi-
ety disorder (except those disorders specifically excluded by the
Act) is a disability only if it is a mental impairment that sub-
stantially limits one's major life activities.
2. Mental Impairments Under the ADA
A "mental impairment" within the meaning of the ADA is a
"mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation,
organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, [or] spe-
cific learning disabilities."3" Some conditions are not impair-
ments: physical characteristics (left-handedness);
characteristic predisposition to illness or disease; common per-
sonality traits (poor judgment or quick temper); or environmen-
tal, cultural, or economic disadvantages (poverty, lack of
education, or a prison record).4"
Congressional debates on the Act reveal that some
lawmakers feared the Act went too far in its coverage of disabil-
ities. Senator William Armstrong of Colorado, for instance,
noted that the courts use psychological classification systems to
determine whether persons were impaired under the Rehabili-
tation Act and wondered if the universe of conditions known to
psychiatry was much broader than the disabilities intended to
be covered by the ADA.41 Congress ultimately settled on a list
of excepted conditions without defining the universe of covered
conditions.42
Some basic conclusions may be drawn from the structure of
the ADA with respect to persons with temporary behavioral dis-
38. The burden of proof in ADA lawsuits is a complex and somewhat unsettled
subject that is beyond the scope of this Comment. For a basic description of the subject,
see 2 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 37, § 50.00, and HENRY R. PERRrr, JR., AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES AcT HANDBOOK 82, 82-85 (1990). For a more thorough critique, see
Kingsley R. Browne, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A "Quota Bill," a Codification of
Griggs, a Partial Return to Wards Cove, or All of the Above?, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
287 (1993).
39. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2) (1993).
40. Id. pt. 1630 app. at 402-03.
41. 135 CONG. REC. S10,765 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989). Senator Armstrong (R-Col.)
noted that "[v]oyeurism is in unless we take it out." Id.
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b) (Supp. III 1991); see supra note 24 and accompanying
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orders. First, persons with less serious or temporary behavioral
disorders will have great difficulty showing that they are sub-
stantially limited by their disorder. Although they suffer disor-
ders catalogued in the American Psychiatric Association's
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-
III-R),43 and may be undergoing treatment, they are likely to be
unable to prove that they are substantially limited in a major
life activity, even that of working. Thus, they will be unable to
claim under the ADA.
Second, although persons with more serious or critical dis-
orders would be disabled within the meaning of the Act, they
would have difficulty demonstrating that they are otherwise
qualified for the position sought. Thus, they too would be
unable to claim under the Act.
Third, some persons with behavioral disorders will present
troublesome questions in the workplace regardless of whether
or not they are accommodated. A race phobia (fear of persons of
a certain race or national origin), for example, presents
problems even if the employee is accommodated. If the
employer attempts to accommodate the disability, perhaps by
isolating the employee from other employees of that specific
race and gender, the employer sends an adverse message to
other workers regarding race and gender. The employer also
arguably tramples the civil rights of the other employees.
Alternatively, if the employee is not found to be disabled under
the ADA, the court risks being perceived as arbitrarily selecting
the disabilities it will protect.44
In sum, the ADA imposes several hurdles that a person
with mental impairments must clear to obtain an ADA judg-
ment against her employer. These hurdles certainly do not
make for an easy road for such a plaintiff. While the policy
behind the ADA is to eliminate discrimination based on disabil-
ity, persons with nonexcluded behavioral disorders still face a
battle if they choose to sue.
III. PHOBIAS AND ANXIETY DISORDERS UNDER THE ADA
Mental impairments are not new to American jurispru-
dence. Many laws recognize mental impairments and treat
43. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS, DSM-III-R (3d ed. rev. 1987) [hereinafter DSM-III-R].
44. Congress has already done this in excluding certain disorders from the
definition of "disability." See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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them in various ways.45 In particular, the Rehabilitation Act
establishes a framework and case law that Congress intends
the ADA to follow in its handling of persons with mental
impairments. 46 Section A orients the reader to mental impair-
ments generally and to behavioral disorders specifically. Sec-
tion B uses Rehabilitation Act case law to predict how the ADA
will treat plaintiffs with behavioral disorders.
A. Phobias and Anxiety Disorders Generally
As one might expect, the diagnosis and treatment of mental
impairments is a vast field of medicine. Researchers in the field
have developed useful classification systems to catalog mental
impairments.47 Two of the most widely-recognized systems are
the DSM-III-R and the World Health Organization's Interna-
tional Classification of Diseases, Injuries, and Causes of Death
(ICD).48 The DSM-III-R is one of the most widely used systems
in the United States today.49 It is intended for clinicians, 50 but
many courts rely on it to classify mental impairments.5 The
DSM-III-R lists approximately thirteen subclasses of mental
impairments. 52 Anxiety disorders comprise one of these sub-
classes. This section provides a broad overview of the field of
mental impairments generally and then explores the anxiety
disorders subclass in more detail.
45. See infra note 188.
46. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. at 402 (1993).
47. David A. Larson, Mental Impairments and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 48
LA. L. REV. 841, 846 (1988).
48. Id. at 849.
49. Id. The DSM-III-R is not without criticism, however, because of the difficulty
of applying diagnostic criteria consistently. Id. at 850. Professor Larson suggests that a
less obvious problem is the distribution of information regarding new developments
because knowledge is advancing too rapidly for anyone to have personal experience with
all the findings of the latest experiments. Id. at 851.
50. DSM-III-R, supra note 43, at XXVI. The DSM-III-R catalogs mental
impairments and provides a "five-axis" classification system for use in the diagnosis of
mental illnesses. Id. at 1-5. The first three axes constitute the diagnostic assessment;
the last two axes supplement the official diagnosis with information useful in planning
treatment and predicting the outcome of treatment. Id. Under the DSM-III-R system,
a person may receive more than one diagnosis. Id.
51. See infra part III.B.
52. The 13 subclasses include organic mental disorders, psychoactive substance use
disorders, schizophrenia, mood disorders, anxiety disorders, somatoform disorders,
dissociative disorders, sexual disorders, sleep disorders, factitious disorders,
adjustment disorders, and psychological factors affecting physical condition. DSM-III-
R, supra note 43, at 5-10.
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1. Mental Impairments
By some estimates, twenty percent of the population of the
United States suffers from diagnosable psychiatric disorders.53
Fifteen percent will suffer an episode of severe depression in
their lifetime.54 Five percent suffer generalized anxiety; five to
ten percent suffer from affective disorders; five to ten percent
suffer severe personality disorders.55 One percent develop
schizophrenia.56
Perhaps those who suffer from severe depression or anxiety
disorders present the most complicated questions for employers.
Unlike mental impairments that are more readily noticeable,
such as retardation or Alzheimer's disease, anxiety disorders
are less apparent to outsiders. Thus, even though anxiety dis-
orders are relatively common, the fact that they are also hidden
means many employers will overlook them. Anxiety disorders
are examined more closely below.
2. Anxiety Disorders
Studies indicate that of the thirteen subclasses of mental
disorders mentioned above, anxiety disorders is the subclass
that is most frequently found in the general population.5 7 Gen-
erally, anxiety disorders fall within seven types: (1) simple pho-
bia, (2) social phobia, (3) agoraphobia, (4) panic disorder, (5)
obsessive compulsive disorder, (6) post-traumatic stress disor-
der, and (7) generalized anxiety disorder.58 These seven anxi-
ety disorders are described briefly below. Because so many
Americans suffer or will suffer one of these disorders, the possi-
ble impact of these disorders on the workplace is significant. It
is for this reason that the ADA's unclear treatment of these dis-
orders is problematic.
a. Simple Phobia
Simple phobia is the most common of the anxiety disor-
ders.59 The essential feature of simple phobia is a persistent
fear of a certain object or situation, as compared to a fear of




57. See DSM-III-R, supra note 43, at 235.
58. Id. at 7.
59. Id.
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having a panic attack (panic disorder) or of humiliation in cer-
tain social situations (social phobia).6 0 According to the DSM-
III-R,
exposure to the simple phobic stimulus almost invariably pro-
vokes an immediate anxiety response... such as feeling pan-
icky, sweating, and having tachycardia [excessively rapid
heartbeat] and difficulty breathing. Anxiety increases or
decreases in a fairly predictable way with changes in the loca-
tion or nature of the phobic stimulus.
6 1
Commonly known phobias include fear of flying, fear of spi-
ders and snakes, fear of heights, fear of public speaking, and
fear of AIDS. Less well known are phobias like "blood-injury"
phobia, a severe uneasiness about blood, injury, or deformity.62
More controversial phobias include AIDS phobia 63 and race
phobia. 64 Because of the highly charged atmosphere surround-
ing race phobias, and because the distinction between such pho-
bias and simple racism is blurred, resolution and
accommodation of individuals with such phobias have the
potential to be highly controversial under the ADA.65
Simple phobias rarely result in marked impairment, and
persons suffering from them seldom seek treatment. 66  The
ADA, as interpreted by the EEOC, requires that an impairment
be more than a temporary, nonchronic condition.67 Thus, per-
60. Id. at 243.
61. Id.
62. Isaac Marks, Blood-Injury Phobia: A Review, AM. J. PSYCHIATRY, Sept.-Dec.
1988, at 1207-13.
63. Many Americans continue to believe erroneously that AIDS is transmitted
through public toilets, shaking hands, and kissing. In reality, the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) is transmitted by injection of infected blood, by
unprotected sex with an infected person, and by "vertical" transmission from an infected
mother to her fetus or newborn. AIDS PRACTICE MANUAL: A LEGAL AND EDUCATIONAL
GUIDE 11-2 to 11-3 (Paul Albert et al. eds., 1988).
64. See Comp Lawyer Nets $450K in Fear Case, NAVL L.J., Dec. 28, 1992, at 7
[hereinafter Comp Lawyer Nets $450K]. The Florida District Court of Appeals affirmed
the Judge of Compensation Claims' decision. Colorcraft Corp., Fuqua Indus. v.
Jandrucko, 576 So. 2d 1320 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2893 (1991).
65. Indeed, many discriminatory attitudes could be said to be phobic, at least if
carried to an extreme. One example would be the extreme attitude demonstrated by
those who espoused and carried out the extermination of millions of Jews in Nazi
Germany.
66. DSM-III-R, supra note 43, at 244. "Impairment may be minimal if the phobic
object is rare and easily avoided, such as fear of snakes in someone living in the city.
Impairment may be considerable if the phobic object is common and cannot be avoided,
such as fear of elevators in someone living in a large city who must use elevators at
work." Id.
67. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. at 403 (1993).
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sons with simple phobias may, from a clinical standpoint, be
unable to state a claim under the ADA.
b. Social Phobia
Social phobias, however, can be more debilitating. They
are marked by the persistent fear of situations in which the per-
son is exposed to possible scrutiny by others and is fearful that
she may humiliate or embarrass herself.68 Some social phobics
have specific fears, such as the fear of public speaking, choking
on food in front of others, being unable to urinate in a public
restroom, or having a hand tremble when writing in the pres-
ence of others.69 Others have more general fears of most social
situations. According to some practitioners, social phobia is
among the most neglected of major anxiety disorders classified
in the DSM-III-R.7 ° Unless the social phobia is severe, it is
rarely incapacitating in itself, but persons with the disorder are
prone to abuse alcohol and barbiturates. 71
c. Agoraphobia
Agoraphobia is the fear of being in places or situations from
which escape might be difficult (or embarrassing), or the fear of
being someplace where help might not be immediately avail-
able. 72 The fear typically results in the person restricting travel
or needing a companion when away from home.73 Common ago-
raphobic situations include being alone outside one's home,
being in a crowd or standing in a line, being on a bridge, and
being in a bus, train, or automobile.74 Sufferers may fear
attacks of dizziness, loss of bladder or bowel control, vomiting,
or cardiac distress. 75 Some agoraphobics have actually exper-
ienced the symptoms in the past; others are agoraphobic
because they fear that the symptoms may develop.76
68. DSM-III-R, supra note 43, at 241.
69. Id.
70. Michael R. Liebowitz et al., Social Phobia: Review of a Neglected Anxiety
Disorder, 42 ARCHivEs GEN. PSYCHIATRY 729 (1985).
71. DSM-III-R, supra note 43, at 242.
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d. Panic Disorder
Persons who suffer from panic disorder experience discrete
periods of intense fear or discomfort that occur unexpectedly.77
Common symptoms include shortness of breath; dizziness,
unsteady feelings, or faintness; choking; trembling or shaking;
sweating; chest pain; fear of dying; and fear of going crazy or of
doing something uncontrolled. 71 Panic disorder may last sev-
eral minutes, weeks, months, or it may last for years. 79 It is
often accompanied by some symptoms of agoraphobia. 0 With-
out agoraphobia, panic disorder may result in little or no
impaired social or occupational functioning; with agoraphobia,
it is much more likely to constrict the lifestyle."'
e. Obsessive Compulsive Disorder
Obsessive compulsive disorder is marked by recurrent
obsessions or compulsions. These obsessions and compulsions
are severe enough to cause marked distress or significantly
interfere with normal work routines, social activities, or rela-
tionships with others. s2 Obsessions are persistent thoughts or
images, mostly intrusive and senseless.8 3 The most common
obsessions are repetitive thoughts of violence (killing one's
child), contamination (getting infected by shaking hands), and
doubt (repeatedly wondering whether one has done something,
such as having injured another person in a traffic accident).8 4
Compulsions are repetitive and intentional behaviors per-
formed in response to an obsession or to other stimuli.8 5
According to the DSM-III-R,
[compulsive behaviors are] designed to neutralize or to pre-
vent discomfort or some dreaded event or situation .... The
person recognizes that his or her behavior is excessive or
unreasonable ... and does not derive pleasure from carrying
out the activity, although it provides a release of tension. The
77. Id. at 235.
78. Id. at 236.
79. Id. at 235-36.
80. Id. at 236.
81. Id.
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most common compulsions involve hand-washing, counting,
checking, and touching.8
6
Impairment under an obsessive compulsive disorder is
often moderate to severe, and complications include major
depression and abuse of alcohol and drugs.
8 7
f Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)
PTSD results from a psychologically distressing event that
is outside the scope of common human experiences."8 The most
common causes of PTSD include a serious threat to one's life, a
serious threat or harm to one's spouse or children, sudden
destruction of one's home or community, and seeing another
person seriously injured or killed.s 9 Such stressors can occur in
combat, accidental disasters (car accidents, airplane crashes,
fires, floods), or in deliberately caused disasters (bombing, tor-
ture, death camps). The traumatic event is often periodically
reexperienced by the individual, conditioning the individual to
avoid all of the stimuli associated with the event.9 ° Impairment
can be mild or severe, and interpersonal relationships may be
affected. 91 Depression and guilt may result in suicidal behavior
or in substance abuse.9 2
g. Generalized Anxiety Disorder
Generalized anxiety disorder is characterized by excessive
worry about two or more life circumstances.93 For example,
worry about possible misfortune to one's child and worry about
finances are common anxiety-producing circumstances.9 4
Implications in the workplace can be seen from all of these
anxiety disorders. In clinicians' terms, some of the disorders
are severely impairing, but professionals usually find that anxi-
ety disorder induced impairment in occupational functioning is
"rarely more than mild."95 Nevertheless, some anxiety disor-
ders could cause a few hours of lost time. Others could create a
86. Id.
87. Id. at 246,
88. Id. at 247.
89. Id. at 247-48.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 248-49.
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danger of injury to other employees. Some, such as race phobia
and AIDS phobia, are sure to create controversy if the ADA is
used to accommodate them. Others will probably not arise in
litigation because they will not, for the most part, seriously
impair their victims. How should courts decide which are disa-
bilities under the ADA? Clear guidance from the EEOC is the
answer. By promulgating guidance on which classification sys-
tem to use and how to determine which impairments are disa-
bilities, the EEOC could eliminate much of the confusion.
Absent further guidance, courts will have to look to Rehabilita-
tion Act case law for help.
B. Possible Treatment of Phobias and Anxiety Disorders
Under the ADA
Congress intended that the case law developed under the
Rehabilitation Act be used to decide ADA questions.9 6 The
Rehabilitation Act also prohibits discrimination against persons
with disabilities, but it covers only those employed by federal
departments and agencies, recipients of federal financial assist-
ance, and federal contractors.97
By applying Rehabilitation Act case law to the require-
ments of the ADA, one can speculate as to how the courts will
decide which phobias and anxiety disorders will be covered by
the ADA. The cases that follow are organized according to the
steps that an ADA plaintiff must take in proving her lawsuit.
First, the plaintiff must prove that she has a mental impair-
ment. Second, the plaintiff must prove that the mental impair-
ment substantially limits her in a major life activity. Third, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that she is qualified with or without
reasonable accommodation. Fourth, she must have sought rea-
sonable accommodation. Finally, the employer may raise
defenses to defeat the plaintiffs case.
96. The ADA retains standards applied under the Rehabilitation Act. The ADA
provides that
[e]xcept as otherwise provided ... nothing in [the ADA] shall be construed to
apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under title V of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 . .. or the regulations issued by Federal agencies
pursuant to such title.
42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (Supp. III 1991). One can assume that this passage demonstrates
Congress' intent not to allow the law under the ADA to diverge from the law under the
Rehabilitation Act. PERRIIr, supra note 38, at 108.
97. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 793-794 (1988).
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1. Requirement That Plaintiff Have a Mental Impairment,
Have A Record of Impairment, or Be Regarded as Having
an Impairment
Rehabilitation Act case law demonstrates two methods by
which the courts have determined whether a claimant has an
impairment. Under one method, the parties stipulate to the
plaintiffs impairment, or the court assumes without deciding
that the plaintiff is impaired and proceeds to a decision as to
whether the plaintiff meets the other requirements of the law.98
Under the second method, the court relies on expert testimony
to decide whether the plaintiff has a legally recognized disabil-
ity.99 Both methods are discussed below.
a. Stipulation by Parties That the Plaintiff Is Impaired
Many Rehabilitation Act cases avoid the question of
whether a particular plaintiff is impaired because the parties
stipulate that the plaintiff is impaired. Doe v. Region 13 Mental
Health-Mental Retardation Commission100 is such a case. In
Region 13, the plaintiff Doe applied for employment as a mental
health associate in defendant's Mental Health Center, repre-
senting that she was in excellent health.10 1 In fact, she had suf-
fered spells of anxiety, insomnia, and depression, and had taken
a potentially lethal overdose of sleeping pills one year prior.
10 2
Ms. Doe was hired and went on to become a superior
employee, but she continued to suffer from the same psychologi-
cal symptomatology as in the previous year. 103 Three months
after starting her job, Ms. Doe began psychotherapy. 0 4 Doctors
diagnosed her as having a depressive neurosis with phobias,
and her psychologist was concerned about the possibility of sui-
cide. 10 5 She voluntarily entered the hospital for medication to
relieve her depression. 106 After two more hospitalizations, psy-
chologists recommended long-term hospitalization, preferably
for one year.' 0 7 Ms. Doe refused the treatment. Nonetheless,
98. See infra part III.B.l.a.
99. See infra part III.B.l.b.
100. 704 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1983).
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she continued her good work, was rated outstanding, and was
given a pay raise.10
Finally, several days before her thirtieth birthday, Ms. Doe
told her coworkers and a psychologist that she would not see
her birthday.10 She said that she would electrocute herself by
dropping her hair dryer into the bathtub." 0 Commitment pro-
ceedings were instituted against her, but were later dis-
missed."' The Mental Health Center, "concerned about funds
and public image," gave her the option of resigning or taking a
long-term leave for hospitalization."' She refused to comply
with either of the Center's requests, and her employment was
terminated. 113
Ms. Doe brought suit under the Rehabilitation Act, seeking
lost wages, damages for pain and suffering, and reinstate-
ment.11 4 The Mental Health Center did not contest that she
was handicapped within the meaning of the Rehabilitation
Act.' 15 The jury found for Ms. Doe. 116 On appeal, the Fifth Cir-
cuit noted that "[t]he Catch-22 implicit in virtually all [Rehabil-
itation Act cases] is particularly evident in this case, that is:
Ms. Doe was required to prove her handicap for jurisdictional
purposes, but simultaneously required to prove that she was
not so handicapped as to be unqualified to perform her job."117
The court concluded that Ms. Doe was handicapped under the
Rehabilitation Act because the parties had so stipulated.1 '
The court went on to determine whether she was otherwise
qualified within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act.' 19
Thus, one method by which the courts analyze mental
impairments is to avoid deciding the question altogether; the
parties simply stipulate to the condition. The inquiry then
focuses on whether the plaintiff is qualified for the position.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1406.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1406-07.
113. Id. at 1407.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1408.
116. Id. at 1407.
117. Id. at 1408 n.6.
118. Id. at 1408.
119. Id. at 1409.
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b. Reliance on Expert Testimony to Determine Whether the
Plaintiff Is Impaired
If the parties refuse to stipulate to the plaintiffs condition,
the court must decide whether the plaintiff is mentally
impaired. In Rehabilitation Act cases, this has been accom-
plished through the use of expert testimony. The expert testi-
mony has often relied on the DSM-III-R.
One case that used expert testimony to establish the plain-
tiffs condition is Doe v. New York University.120 In that case,
the plaintiff Jane Doe was accepted to NYU Medical School
after falsely representing that she had no chronic illnesses or
emotional problems. 12 1 In fact, she was suffering from serious
psychiatric and mental disorders, which resulted in numerous
self-destructive acts and attacks on others. 122 Tragically, her
self-destructive acts included overdosing on sleeping pills,
attempting suicide by drinking potassium cyanide, cutting her
stomach with a knife, and repeatedly severing veins in her
arms.123 A routine medical screening at NYU led to the discov-
ery of her medical history. NYU requested her resignation, and
she was placed on a leave of absence with no guarantees of
reinstatement. 124
The plaintiff Doe then underwent therapy and applied for
readmission to NYU almost two years later.125 After a profes-
sor of clinical psychiatry at NYU concluded that the plaintiffs
prognosis was guarded in stressful situations, NYU declined to
readmit her.'2 6 She sued for readmission under the Rehabilita-
tion Act.' 27
The plaintiff was diagnosed with a borderline personality
disorder. 28 Doctors predicted that the disorder would continue
through most of her adult life, modifiable only by therapy and
120. 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981). Although this case is not an employment
discrimination case (plaintiff brought suit under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29
U.S.C. § 794 (1988), because NYU is a recipient of federal funds), it is decided under the
Rehabilitation Act and the same definitions of mental impairment are used. Id. at 770.
121. Id. at 765-66.
122. Id. at 766.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 767-68.
125. Id. at 768.
126. Id. at 770 n.2.
127. Id. at 770.
128. Id. at 771. The court noted that a borderline personality disorder is "a serious
psychiatric problem that is extremely difficult to cure and ... can lead to the type of
self-destructive behavior that Doe had engaged in in the past." Id.
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by avoiding the situations with which she could not cope."'
The trial court found that she was a handicapped person within
the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act and that she was other-
wise qualified because she would more than likely "be able to
complete her course of medical studies and serve creditably as a




On appeal, the Second Circuit agreed that the plaintiff was
a handicapped person.' 3 3 The court reached its decision by rely-
ing on
independent evidence of her extensive history of mental
impairments requiring hospitalizations and her departure
from NYU . . .because of her psychiatric problems, all of
which indicate that she has suffered from a substantial limi-
tation on a major life activity, the ability to handle stressful
situations of the type faced in a medical training milieu.1
34
The court found that NYU "regarded [the plaintiff] as having
such an impairment" because the school considered her to be an
unacceptable risk. 135 Thus, the court used expert evidence to
find the plaintiff to be a handicapped person.
Region 13 and New York University demonstrate two meth-
ods by which plaintiffs can prove that they are impaired. First,
where the plaintiff is seriously impaired, as in Region 13, the
parties can stipulate to the impairment. The question then
becomes whether the plaintiff is otherwise qualified. Second,
the court can rely on expert testimony, which often uses the
DSM-III-R, to decide whether the plaintiff is impaired.
2. Requirement of a Substantial Limitation on a Major
Life Activity
As noted in Part II of this Comment, determining whether
a mental impairment exists is only the first step of a discrimi-
nation charge under the ADA. The second step requires the
129. Id. at 768.
130. Id. at 772.
131. Id. at 765.
132. Id. at 773.
133. Id. at 775.
134. Id.
135. Id. The court reinforced its conclusion by noting the wide scope of the
definition of "mental impairment" and by legislative history, which indicated that the
"definition is not to be construed in a niggardly fashion." Id. (citing S. REP. No. 1297,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 6388-91).
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plaintiff to demonstrate that the mental impairment substan-
tially limits her in one or more of her major life activities.
136
One Rehabilitation Act case helped develop the concept of a
major life activity. Forrisi v. Bowen137 examined a phobia's
effect on the major life activity of working.13 8 Mr. Forrisi was
hired by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS) as a utility systems repairer.139 When Mr. Forrisi told
his supervisor that he could not climb to certain heights
because of acrophobia, 4 ° he was told that he could not meet the
job requirements. 14 1 Mr. Forrisi insisted that he could do the
work if DHHS would make some "adjustments to accommodate
his fears." 42 Two months later, he was terminated by DHHS
for being "medically unable to perform the full range of the
duties of [his] position."
143
Mr. Forrisi brought suit under section 505 of the Rehabili-
tation Act,' 44 alleging that he was regarded as a handicapped
individual by DHHS even though he was not handicapped.' 45
The Fourth Circuit ruled that Mr. Forrisi failed to allege a
prima facie case.' 46 Although his condition left him "incapable
of satisfying the singular demands of a particular job," the court
found that he had not shown that his mental condition limited
him in the major life activity of working. 47 The court noted
that "[t]he statutory reference to a substantial limitation indi-
cates instead that an employer regards an employee as handi-
capped in his or her ability to work by finding the employee's
impairment to foreclose generally the type of employment
involved."'4 ' The court found for DHHS. 49
136. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (Supp. III 1991).
137. 794 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1986).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 933.
140. "Acrophobia" is defined as an abnormally intense fear of being in high places.
WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY 19 (2d ed. 1975).
141. Forrisi, 794 F.2d at 933.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1988).
145. Forrisi, 794 F.2d at 934.
146. The court of appeals affirmed a summary judgment for the employer. Id. at
932.
147. Id. at 935.
148. Id. (emphasis added).
149. Id. One commentator suggests that the ADA may be interpreted more broadly
than the Fourth Circuit did in Forrisi. He believes that "major life activity" under the
ADA is meant to be more broadly defined than solely by reference to the workplace.
PERRITT, supra note 38, at 26 n.14.
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Just as Mr. Forrisi's Rehabilitation Act case foundered
because he could not show that his fear of heights limited him
in the major life activity of working, so too might many persons
with behavioral disorders have difficulty in making such a
showing under the ADA. A person with a phobic fear of flying,
for instance, may have difficulty showing that his phobia sub-
stantially limits him in his particular job and in the entire class
of jobs he is trained to do. Perhaps a flight attendant, for exam-
ple, could make this showing. But would that person be able to
meet the minimum requirements of the job? Because the ability
to work while airborne is an essential function of the flight
attendant's job description, such a person would probably not
meet the minimum requirements. In essence, as long as the
employer's requirements are job related, nondiscriminatory,
and necessary for the business, the ADA does not require the
employer to change them.15 0
3. Requirement That the Plaintiff Be Qualified for the Job
Under the ADA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that she is
qualified for the position, with or without reasonable accommo-
dation. 5 ' Early versions of the ADA required a plaintiff to
demonstrate that she is "otherwise qualified."152 The House
Committee on the ADA wrote that "otherwise qualified"
describes a person with a disability who meets all of an
employer's job-related selection criteria except those that she
cannot meet because of her disability, but which could be met
with a reasonable accommodation.' 5 3 The Committee noted
that the otherwise qualified person must then be offered the
reasonable accommodation that would make the individual a
"qualified individual with a disability."' 54 But Congress found
the Rehabilitation Act's otherwise qualified requirement to be
too controversial and deleted the word "otherwise" from the
ADA. 155 Thus, a plaintiff must be disabled, but not too dis-
abled, to state a claim under the ADA.
If the plaintiff suffers from a social phobia or from an
extreme reaction to stress and criticism, he or she may not qual-
150. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (Supp. III 1991).
151. Id. § 12112(b)(3), (5)A)-(B).
152. HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, H. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 2, at 64-65 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 346-47.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See generally 3A LARSON & LARSON, supra note 37, § 108A.31(a).
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ify for a job or for a particular class of jobs. In one Rehabilita-
tion Act case, Pesterfield v. Tennessee Valley Authority,156 the
plaintiff demonstrated a disabling mental condition, but the
court found him to be too disabled for the job.
157
In that case, Mr. Pesterfield was employed by the Tennes-
see Valley Authority (TVA) as an hourly construction worker.
1 58
An on-the-job injury left him unable to continue as a construc-
tion worker. 59 TVA's Rehabilitation Section found him tempo-
rary work as a tool room attendant, a largely sedentary
position.' 60 In the years following, TVA supervisors admon-
ished him for tardiness, falling asleep on the job, failing to use
tool checkout procedures, and being uncooperative and discour-
teous to coworkers.' 16 Mr. Pesterfield complained of "nervous-
ness and anxiety" related to what he perceived as harassment
by his superiors.6 2 He was hospitalized for five weeks of psy-
chiatric treatment. 163 His psychiatrist reported that
[Mr. Pesterfield] feels very inadequate secondary to dimin-
ished physical capacities surrounding his [on-the-job injury.]
He continues to hold the belief of being victimized by "com-
pany policy" and fears that he will be retired without just
compensation.... If there is the slightest hint of rejection or
criticism, he becomes extremely anxious and
depressed.... 164
Based on the psychiatrist's report, TVA's doctor concluded that
Mr. Pesterfield was unable to work safely and refused to clear
him to return to work.' 65 The doctor refused, however, to cer-
tify that the psychiatric condition was job related. 6 6 One
month later, Mr. Pesterfield burst into the TVA doctor's office,
swore at the doctor, and threatened to kill himself because of
the doctor's decision. 16 7 Soon thereafter, TVA terminated him
for medical reasons. 168
156. 941 F.2d 437 (6th Cir. 1991).
157. Id. at 443-44.
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Although the trial court concluded that Mr. Pesterfield had
a mental impairment that substantially limited his ability to
work, it did not find him to be a "qualified handicapped person"
because he was unable to perform the essential functions of his
work. 169
The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that Mr. Pesterfield
"was already working in the least stressful job at the plant,"
and that it "would be unreasonable to require that TVA place
[Mr. Pesterfield] at a virtually stress-free environment and
immunize him from any criticism in order to accommodate his
disability."7 ° The court also found that Mr. Pesterfield failed to
prove TVA's decision was based on discriminatory intent rather
than on reasoned medical judgment that he could not be
returned to work safely under any accommodation that TVA
could make.1 71
Pesterfield teaches several lessons. First, conditions such
as the one Mr. Pesterfield suffered are recognized as mental
impairments under the Rehabilitation Act. Given that the ADA
is to be built on Rehabilitation Act case law, Mr. Pesterfield's
condition should be a mental impairment under the ADA. Sec-
ond, given similar facts, a court might find no duty to accommo-
date if the employer has already placed the plaintiff in the least
stressful job in the facility. Third, if the employer demonstrates
any discriminatory intent in his treatment of the plaintiff, the
employer is likely to be liable under the ADA.
Furthermore, if the plaintiff passes employer-established
performance standards and performance reviews, the employer
will have difficulty contending that the plaintiff is not qualified
for the position. In Gillespie v. Derwinski, 72 for example,
Dianne Kent was a forty year old developmentally disabled
woman employed by a Veterans Administration hospital laun-
dry.1 73 Her experienced supervisor calmly corrected her when
169. Id. at 441-42. The trial court noted that the "[p]laintiffs job of tool room
attendant required at least the ability to get along with supervisors and coworkers.
Given plaintiffs inability to tolerate even the slightest hint of rejection or criticism, it
would be impossible for him to perform the essential functions of his work." Id.
170. Id. at 442-44.
171. Id. at 443-44.
172. 790 F. Supp. 1032 (E.D. Wash. 1991).
173. Id. at 1035. Plaintiff found employment through a special program for hiring
persons with disabilities. She was mentally retarded and had an emotional disability.
Id.
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she did something wrong. 174  Her supervisor reprimanded
coworkers when they taunted Ms. Kent for being "retarded."75
But after fifteen months, Ms. Kent's supervisor was
replaced by an inexperienced person who failed to stop other
workers from taunting Ms. Kent.' 76 The new supervisor also
complained about Ms. Kent's general appearance and about her
productivity levels, despite the fact that Ms. Kent had per-
formed over 132% of the work standard for her position. 177 Fur-
ther, performance evaluations indicated that Ms. Kent worked
above the standards required for her position. 178 Soon after the
change of supervisors, Ms. Kent was hospitalized for a break-
down.17 9 She returned to work, but was later hospitalized after
a confrontation with coworkers.8 0 She resigned and brought
suit under the Rehabilitation Act.' 8 '
The parties stipulated that Ms. Kent was a handicapped
person; the question was whether she was otherwise quali-
fied.'8 2 The district court concluded that her strong perform-
ance ratings, her ability to perform at 132% of the standard,
and the fact that she posed no risk of injury to herself or her
coworkers, led to no other conclusion but that she was other-
wise qualified.8 3 The court reasoned that even if she was not
otherwise qualified, had her second supervisor continued the
soft approach to discipline that her first supervisor had used,
Ms. Kent probably would have continued to be a productive
employee. 1 8 4 The court found that Ms. Kent had been construc-
tively discharged and it ordered the hospital to reinstate her.'
8 5
Pesterfield and Gillespie indicate that employer-established
performance standards are given weight in evaluating whether
a person with disabilities is qualified for a position. If a person
174. Id. at 1035-36.
175. Id. at 1036.
176. Plaintiff was subjected to comments such as "can't you work any faster than
that?" The new supervisor also lectured the plaintiff on getting along with coworkers.
Id. at 1037.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1039. She was given a fully successful rating for 1986-87 and 1987-88.
Id.
179. Id. at 1038.
180. Id. Despite her criticism of plaintiff, the new supervisor rated the plaintiff as
fully satisfactory and fully successful in the following two years, respectively. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1039.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1040.
185. Id. at 1041.
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meets the standard and performs satisfactory work, the
employer will have difficulty arguing that the person is not
qualified for the position. On the other hand, there is a limit to
the lengths an employer must go to demonstrate that a person
is not qualified for a position. As Pesterfield shows, if the per-
son cannot handle the least stressful position in the employer's
business, courts are not likely to require further accommodation
attempts.
4. Requirement That the Employer Provide a
Reasonable Accommodation
An employer must make a reasonable accommodation to
the known limitation of a qualified person with a disability
unless the accommodation would cause an undue hardship on
the operation of its business."8 6 But this requirement raises an
interesting question. Would a social phobic, for example, be
qualified for a sales position or a customer service job? The
answer is likely dependent on the reasonable accommodation
provided by the employer. Perhaps a person who fears criticism
could be accommodated in a manner similar to the Gillespie
accommodation-a soft approach to discipline and a conversa-
tional, instructive tone.1 8 7 Gillespie typifies the approach that
employers should take in providing reasonable
accommodations.
The plaintiff must satisfy the requirements listed above to
state a prima facie case under the ADA. Once he has proved
that he has an impairment, that the impairment substantially
limits him in a major life activity, that he is qualified for the
position sought with or without reasonable accommodation, and
that he asked for a reasonable accommodation, the burden
shifts to the defendant to challenge elements of the plaintiff's
case or to assert any available defenses.
Although the Rehabilitation Act and its case law are the
most analogous laws to the ADA, other federal and state stat-
utes provide examples of accommodation of behavioral disor-
ders. These statutes either provide disability coverage for
persons with such disorders or prohibit discrimination against
186. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5XA) (Supp. III 1991); TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL,
supra note 25, at 1-5.
187. Gillespie, 790 F. Supp. at 1035-36.
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such persons.18 8  Although these cases provide little guidance
on how the ADA should address behavioral disorders, they
demonstrate some of the diverse situations in which such disor-
ders arise in the workplace. More importantly, they suggest the
possible impact that the ADA will have on the workplace. If
fear of flying, agoraphobia, race phobia, and spider phobia have
been presented as disabilities to courts under various state and
federal statutes, they will surely be presented under the ADA.
When they are, there will surely be two sides to the question of
whether they should be disabilities under the ADA.
188. For instance, other federal laws provide examples of phobia cases that were
pursued as disabilities. See, e.g., Turner v. Office of Personnel Management, 707 F.2d
1499. 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that the claimant who developed a
psychophysiological gastrointestinal reaction and phobic fear of air travel, a mental
illness as defined by the DSM-III-R, had been wrongly denied disability retirement
because the U.S. government ignored the physical manifestation of his disease and
ignored the fact that his phobia is classified as a mental illness by the DSM-III-R).
Some state workers' compensation statutes allow compensation for phobia-like
symptoms. See, e.g., Bailey v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 279 S.W.2d 315, 316-17 (Tex.
1955) (allowing compensation for a claimant who, after watching his partner fall to his
death from a scaffold eight stories above the ground, could not resume work); see also
Followhill v. Emerson Elec. Co., 674 P.2d 1050, 1053 (Kan. 1984) (disallowing
compensation because the state statute did not cover mental injuries where a claimant
saw a coworker crushed to death in a press); Guillot v. Sentry Ins. Co., 472 So. 2d 197,
200-01 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (allowing compensation for a claims adjuster who suffered a
nervous breakdown upon being unexpectedly informed that he was fired); Breeden v.
Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 285 S.E.2d 398, 401 (W. Va. 1981) (allowing
compensation for a supermarket cashier who, after serving under a supervisor who
repeatedly fondled, criticized, and belittled her, suffered a depressive neurosis).
One very controversial workers' compensation case is the basis of the opening
hypothetical in this Comment. In it, a 63-year old white female employee had been
mugged by a young African American male while she performed a work-related errand.
See Comp Lawyer Nets $450K, supra note 64. She developed a post-traumatic phobia of
black males that required psychiatric care. Id. Allegedly, her phobia prevented her
from working without a guarantee that she would not come in contact with black males.
Id. Florida awarded her workers' compensation benefits for a work-related disability,
and the award was affirmed per curiam by the Florida Court of Appeals. Id. This case
also presents an interesting question for the ADA: Where is the line to be drawn
between reasonable accommodation of impairment and violation of fellow employees'
associational and civil rights? In other words, does the case simply elevate extreme
forms of racism to favored legal status?
Finally, many states have antidiscrimination statutes, which may allow phobias as
handicaps. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 659.425 (1991); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60 (1992).
In Leggett v. First Interstate Bank, 739 P.2d 1083 (Or. Ct. App. 1987), for example, the
Oregon Court of Appeals assumed without deciding that spider phobia is a handicap
under Oregon law. Id. at 1087. The court held that the plaintiff had not been
terminated because of discrimination based on her spider phobia; rather, the plaintiff
had been let go for nondiscriminatory reasons. Id. at 1087-88.
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IV. CONSIDERATIONS OF PERSONS WITH BEHAVIORAL
DISORDERS AND A PROPOSAL FOR ACTION
In some ways, the ADA's treatment of persons with physi-
cal disabilities is easier to predict than is its treatment of per-
sons with mental disabilities. Generally speaking, we as a
society are more cognizant of persons with physical impair-
ments. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that employers and
courts react in a similar fashion. Section A discusses pragmatic
considerations regarding persons with behavioral disorders.
Section B suggests a plan for EEOC action.
A. Pragmatic Considerations
No discussion of mental impairments under the ADA
should omit the real-world concerns of those who will work with
and under the Act. By definition, two groups will be principally
affected by Title I of the ADA-employees and employers.
From the employee's (or prospective employee's) stand-
point, there may be an understandable reluctance to file a com-
plaint with the EEOC or bring a lawsuit against the employer.
The employee may feel that taking the employer to court will
impair future employability, especially with the employer being
sued. And, as one commentator observed about the Rehabilita-
tion Act, many plaintiffs' disabilities bring on a social stigma
that tends to isolate the plaintiffs from society.18 9 Plaintiffs
may feel less inclined to endure the public scrutiny that a law-
suit might entail because of such isolation. 190
Employers, on the other hand, may be concerned with
whether the Act requires them to take affirmative action to hire
persons with disabilities, and, if so, how they should comply.
Employers must also consider the potentially significant costs
of not complying with the ADA."' Because the Act is relatively
. 189. David A. Larson, What Disabilities Are Protected Under the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973?, 16 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 229, 237 (1986).
190. Id.
191. The punitive damages remedy available under the ADA could make
noncompliance very expensive. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (Supp. III 1991) (providing
that the ADA adopts the "powers, procedures, and remedies" of certain provisions of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). Congress amended Title VII in 1991 so that
tort-style damages, including compensatory and punitive damages, could be awarded.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (Supp. III 1991).
One attorney who represents management advised his clients that they "don't want
to be the guinea pig for [ADA] litigation." Randall Samborn, Disabilities Act Regs Draw
Mixed Reactions, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 12, 1991, at 10.
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new, plaintiffs may be waiting to file actions to test its scope. 192
These concerns dictate that managers quickly grasp the ADA's
requirements. Employers are likely to have come in contact
with physical disabilities, such as persons in wheelchairs, per-
sons with heart monitors, or persons with disfiguring condi-
tions. A well-intentioned boss may be more likely to
sympathize with an applicant or employee who seeks accommo-
dation in the form of an adjustable-height computer keyboard or
a window shade designed to reduce sun glare than she would
with an employee who complains of a behavioral disorder or
phobia.
Employers may want to avoid persons with anxiety disor-
ders altogether. Employers might be informed about persons
who are mentally retarded, but totally uninformed about per-
sons with anxiety disorders and phobias. For example, most
would agree that allowing an employee to take prescribed medi-
cations at specified intervals throughout the day is a reasonable
accommodation, but what about the employee who refuses to
take the medication? Can the employer be held liable? Must
the employer supervise the taking of medication? What about
the employee who poses no threat to others' safety while medi-
cated, but is a direct threat when he fails to take his medica-
tion? Is accommodation required then? These are valid
questions, and the answers are somewhat elusive.
Even a mental disability such as mental retardation is
arguably easier to quantify and comprehend by a lay person
than an anxiety disorder or disabling phobia. As one commen-
tator suggests, "when the disability is mental retardation,
actual or perceived, the evaluation of reasonable accommoda-
tion possibilities and undue hardship allegations involves the
same quantifiable factors that controversy over a physical disa-
bility involves."193 Reasonable accommodation alternatives for
a mentally retarded employee are likely to be more readily
available than for an employee with an anxiety disorder. For
example, several organizations have literature and information
telephone lines designed to assist employers in accommodating
employees with classic mental impairments.
1 94
192. See, e.g., Joanna Stark Abramson, Employment Provisions of ADA Are
Effective Now, MICH. L. WKLY, July 27, 1992, at 3.
193. PERRITT, supra note 38, at 8.
194. In the states of Washington, Idaho, Oregon, and Alaska, for example,
information is available through the Northwest Disability Business Technical
Assistance Center, P.O. Box 9046 Mailstop 6000, Olympia, WA 98507-9046.
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But mental disabilities that involve anxiety disorders
involve a more difficult assessment. Evaluating reasonable
accommodation and undue hardship for these impairments puts
parties and tribunals in the difficult position of deciding what
kinds ofjob behaviors are acceptable in the workplace and when
traditional standards of behavior must change. 1
95
Additionally, persons with anxiety disorders arguably suf-
fer more severe and stigmatizing treatment by our society than
those who suffer physical disabilities. We feel sorry for the
amputee or the blind person, yet we often refer to the person
suffering from a depressive neurosis as sick or crazy. Moreover,
we may feel downright outraged at the caucasian woman who
has a phobia so crippling that she is unable to work with Afri-
can American men.
Beyond these outward feelings toward persons with disabil-
ities, we may feel less inclined to help or to want to accommo-
date someone who looks fine from the outside, but who really
suffers a debilitating mental illness. In other words, a person
who is mentally retarded may exhibit characteristics that
others recognize. In contrast, a person who suffers a depressive
neurosis is likely to seem fine from outward appearances.
Maybe we expect more from a person who appears normal and
healthy than from one who is profoundly retarded. The discrim-
inatory impact of such stereotypes is apparent.
Clearly, irrational fears and prejudices that result in dis-
crimination are prohibited by the ADA. As one House Commit-
tee noted,
The EEOC's A Technical Assistance Manual on the Employment Provisions of the
Americans With Disabilities Act also provides an extensive directory of technical
assistance resources available nationwide to aid the employment of persons with
disabilities. See TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 25.
One commentator offers the following examples of reasonable accommodations for
persons with mental disabilities:
(1) reduce noise levels by placing an employee in a smaller, more isolated area;
(2) assign repetitive operations or a variety of tasks, depending on the employee's
condition;
(3) limit the number of people the employee must deal with;
(4) provide supervision that is close, moderate, or minimal, depending on the employee;
(5) ensure that lines of authority are well defined to reduce ambiguity; and
(6) provide supervision that includes warm guidance or firm direction, depending on
the employee.
V. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYING HANDICAPPED PERSONS: MEETING EEO OBLIGATIONS 56-57
(1980).
195. PERRIrT, supra note 38, at 8.
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a person who is rejected from a job because of the myths,
fears and stereotypes associated with disabilities would be
covered under [the regarded as disabled] test, whether or not
the employer's perception was shared by others in the field
and whether or not the person's physical or mental condition
would be considered a disability under the first or second part
of the definition."
6
Similarly, employers may not rely on such fears and prejudices
in making reasonable accommodation and undue hardship
decisions.
Moreover, an employer cannot base a refusal to accommo-
date on adverse coworker or customer reactions to the physical
appearance of a person. Legislative history indicates a concern
that acceptance by coworkers and customers is one barrier iden-
tified by sociologists that frequently results in employers
excluding disabled persons. 1 97 If employers cannot discrimi-
nate on this basis, it is reasonable to infer that the ADA will
prohibit them from basing a refusal to accommodate on it.
Following similar reasoning, an employer should not be
able to base a refusal to accommodate a mentally impaired per-
son on the expected adverse reactions of his coworkers or cus-
tomers. Nor should the employer be able to rely on such
reactions when determining whether an undue hardship
exists. 198
Clearly, the ADA requires employers to examine the way
they treat individuals with disabilities. Employers must take
positive steps to ensure equality of opportunity and full partici-
pation for such individuals.' 99 Thus, traditional behavior
norms cannot be relied on to segregate, classify, or exclude
someone with a mental impairment. Traditional behavior
norms can, however, make employers more aware of behavior
disorders such as fear of flying, fear of AIDS, and fear of
heights. After all, most of us have experienced these and simi-
196. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDicIARY, H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt.
3, at 30-31 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 453.
197. Id.
198. For instance, the Equal Employment Advisory Council, a group representing
business concerns, was concerned that "a person might exhibit 'bizarre behavior that is
not the result of any mental impairment but is merely a personality trait. While
customers might react negatively to that person or presume that he is mentally
impaired, that reaction, and the employer's action in response, would not confer ADA
coverage.'" See Business Groups Ask EEOC for More Flexibility, Guidance in Disability
Rules, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 98, at A-1 (May 21, 1991).
199. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8)-(b) (Supp. III 1991).
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lar fears to varying degrees. We probably know people who
refuse to fly or are leery about high places, and perhaps we suf-
fer the same fears.
But how many of us have experienced race phobia, social
phobia, or spider phobia? Behaviors such as these, which differ
dramatically from those traditionally acceptable, could conceiv-
ably create a substantial impediment to the normal functioning
of the workplace. 20 0 The situation in Colorcraft Corp., Fuqua
Industries, Inc. v. Jandrucko,201 from which this Comment's
introductory hypothetical was taken, raises an additional prob-
lem, namely that accommodations of these disorders implicate
policies and law beyond the ADA. Thus, perhaps race phobia
should, for policy reasons, simply not be classified as a disabil-
ity. After all, the ADA expressly excludes other conditions that
would meet the technical definition of disability.20 2 Alterna-
tively, even if race phobias qualify as disabilities, perhaps they
should be treated as conditions that are not accommodated
under the ADA on the grounds that not every trait causing
others to react negatively will constitute a disability under the
ADA. For instance, an employee may exhibit bizarre behavior
in the form of a personality trait rather than a mental impair-
ment; this employee will be unable to claim coverage under the
ADA.2 °3
Thus, an employer and the fact-finder are presented with
the problem of where to draw the line between behaviors that
must be protected by the ADA and those that need not be. One
commentator suggests that the EEOC should be the first to
draw the line, then the courts will step in.24
B. A Call for EEOC Action
Because employer scrutiny of those with hidden behavioral
anomalies is likely to be worse than of persons with more obvi-
ous mental disorders or with physical disabilities, more protec-
tions are needed to put persons with hidden behavioral
anomalies on par with the rest of the community of persons
with disabilities. Those who suffer panic disorders or social
phobia, for example, are likely to be treated more harshly if
200. PERRITr, supra note 38, at 8.
201. See Comp Lawyer Nets $450K, supra note 64: see also supra note 188.
202. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
203. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. at 402-03 (1993); see supra note 40 and accompanying
text.
204. PERRITT, supra note 38, at 8.
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they seek an accommodation from their employers than are per-
sons who are blind or in wheelchairs. The extra protections
needed would recognize these and other perils of persons with
hidden disorders.
On the other hand, too much protection could be counter-
productive. For example, any accommodation granted to per-
sons such as race phobics would have to be balanced against the
burden on the civil rights of the race phobics' coworkers.
The ADA requires individualized examinations of disabili-
ties and individualized treatment.2 °5 A logical extension of
such treatment is a system whereby those that have disorders
more likely to be stereotyped and stigmatized get additional
help from the Act.
Of course, one alternative is to do nothing and allow per-
sons with behavioral disorders to bring their cases to court, one
by one, relying on the statutory safeguards already contained in
the ADA. This alternative would require plaintiffs to clear each
of the hurdles discussed earlier in Part III. This solution, how-
ever, runs the risk of causing haphazard case results that may
not protect the persons that the ADA intends to protect. This
solution also has the potential, as some employers would sug-
gest, to protect plaintiffs too well, thereby further eroding any
right of the employers to be free of government interference in
the workplace.
For example, haphazard case law development could result
from courts attempting to legislate the question raised in this
Comment's introductory hypothetical-that is, the proper
boundary between an employee's right to nondiscrimination on
the basis of her race phobia and her coworkers' civil rights of
freedom of association and equal protection of the laws. 20 6 The
courts will have to deal with the inevitable clash between the
ADA's requirement of individual treatment and the require-
ments of other federal laws, such as the Civil Rights Act or fed-
eral labor laws.
Haphazard results could also arise because Congress has
excluded some recognized mental impairments from coverage
under the Act. The crucial question remains open-whether
205. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. at 403 (1993) (noting that whether an individual
has a disability is not necessarily based on the impairment, but rather on the effect of
that impairment on the individual).
206. See supra note 188. Although the case arose under Florida workers'
compensation statutes, its facts are applicable to the ADA.
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the ADA will be interpreted to include and protect all other con-
ditions listed in the DSM-III-R. Haphazard results are likely to
arise unless the courts recognize that persons with hidden
behavioral disorders need as least as many of the protections of
the ADA as persons with more apparent disabilities.
To prevent such haphazard results, the EEOC should take
action. Two simple solutions present themselves: First, the
EEOC should approve one or more of the commonly used classi-
fication systems for use by the courts in handling mental
impairment cases. Second, the EEOC should formally recog-
nize that persons with hidden disorders need more protection
under the ADA.
EEOC could implement these solutions in a variety of ways.
First, the EEOC could pass administrative rules to settle the
question of which standards to use in determining whether an
individual is mentally impaired. Rather than the courts relying
on the DSM-1l-R in some cases and not in others, the EEOC
should study the problem and then decide whether conditions
listed in the DSM-III-R will be accepted wholesale, or whether
the agency will specify the particular conditions protected by
the ADA. Even if the EEOC were to do nothing more than man-
date that all disorders specified in the DSM-III-R (except those
already excluded by the ADA) fit the definition of mental
impairment under the Act, it would greatly improve the present
state of the law.
Second, the EEOC could issue interpretive guidance that
recognizes the issues surrounding persons with hidden anxiety
disorders and phobias. Such guidance should provide clear
instruction as to whether persons with hidden disorders will get
additional help from the Act.
An alternative suggestion would be to have the EEOC issue
interpretive guidance in the form of a framework for use by the
courts in determining what behaviors are acceptable in the
workplace. Such persuasive guidelines would provide assist-
ance in the handling of claims under the ADA and would ame-
liorate public intolerance and stereotyping of those with latent
or hidden disabilities. Moreover, both of these proposals for
EEOC action would assist courts in establishing important
ADA case law.
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V. CONCLUSION
Because employer scrutiny of those with hidden behavioral
anomalies is likely to be worse than employer scrutiny of per-
sons with more obvious mental disorders or with physical disa-
bilities, more accommodation is needed to put persons with
hidden behavioral anomalies on a level playing field with the
rest of the disabled community. Given that the ADA requires
individualized examination of each disability and individual-
ized treatment, a logical application is to give additional help to
those who have disorders more likely to be stereotyped, misun-
derstood, and stigmatized, and less likely to be forgiven.
The EEOC could provide the solution by taking two meas-
ures. First, it should issue a rule on whether the DSM-III-R is
to be used as the source to determine whether a particular con-
dition is a mental impairment. Second, the EEOC should deter-
mine whether any additional disorders are to be excluded from
the Act and whether persons with hidden disorders should
receive any different treatment under the Act. Such interpre-
tive guidance could go a long way toward helping the victims of
public intolerance and stereotyping-and toward ensuring that
employers know the rules.
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